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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis considers the role of Kemalism in Turkish American diasporic identities and 
asks how the ideology has been reconstructed in an American diaspora context, in 
response to transnational pressures. The analysis relies on data from interviews conducted 
with a specific population of first generation Turkish Americans in the Southeast 
Michigan region, as well as participant observation carried out at a Michigan-based 
Turkish cultural organization. I argue that Kemalism is central to Turkish American 
diasporic identity and has been reconstructed in three main forms in diaspora: as an act of 
belonging in American society, an act of cultural retention in diaspora, and a response to 
a loss of legitimacy in Turkish society. By considering how Turkish American 
experiences in American society have influenced their embrace of Kemalism, I highlight 
how long-distance nationalism is a phenomenon that evolves in response to transnational 
pressures. With my findings, I attempt to complicate previous studies of long-distance 
nationalism by highlighting how Kemalist Turkish Americans present a unique example 
to diaspora studies, and by emphasizing how long-distance nationalism is a transnational 
phenomenon inextricably linked to not only home country pressures but also domestic 
host country dynamics. 
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	 1 
INTRODUCTION 
	
 
Every year on the 29th of October, in a conference room in suburban Southeast 
Michigan, the Turkish American Cultural Association of Michigan, or TACAM, hosts its 
annual “Republic Day Ball” in honor of Turkish Independence Day. The room is adorned 
with Turkish flags, as well as many posters and a life-size cardboard cut-out of Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic. While the event serves as a 
way for Turkish families to mingle with plenty of food and music, it is started off by talks 
from community leaders and local politicians. The opening remarks, which proceed after 
a performance of both the Turkish and American national anthems, serve to acquaint any 
unknowing visitors with the history of the Turkish Republic and the contributions of its 
founder Atatürk. According to TACAM and many Turks, it is a story of civilizational 
triumph- one of a modern, secular, and Western-friendly leader who defeated the 
backwards Muslim leaders of the Ottoman Empire. The remarks are also meant to 
emphasize how the values of the Kemalism and the Turkish Republic, and consequently 
Turkish Americans, are compatible with those of American society. Friendship between 
members of the Turkish American community and Americans is emphasized, in addition 
to information about how Turkish Americans are contributing to their local communities. 
While this event represents a small glimpse into one subset of Turkish Americans, it 
stands as a fascinating example of diaspora dynamics, where the forces of home-country 
politics play out within an American diaspora community, eager to organize and present 
themselves as productive, ideologically coherent members of American society while 
embracing the secular nationalist ideology of their home state.  
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I am interested in examining Turkish American diasporic identity, specifically in 
the case of Kemalist Turkish Americans who strongly identify with and organize around 
Kemalism, or the official secular nationalist ideology of the Turkish Republic. This 
population of Turkish Americans is of particular interest, as the broad and diverse 
literature on Turkish diasporas has traditionally overlooked Kemalist Turks. Therefore, 
with this study I hope better understand why Kemalism, as an ideology that is typically 
analyzed solely within the national context of Turkey, is so prevalent in Turkish 
American identities and so central to their local and community organizing. In order to 
answer these questions, I attempt to incorporate a transnational viewpoint which 
considers not only how developments in Turkey, or the ‘home country’, are influencing 
diasporic identities but also developments in the ‘host country’ of the United States. I 
find that both factors are significant to understanding the role of Kemalism in the Turkish 
American diaspora. I argue that pressures from American society in the form of feelings 
of marginalization and alienation have led Turkish American actors to embrace 
Kemalism as an act of belonging and cultural retention in the diaspora, while pressures 
from their home country in the form of a loss of legitimacy in Turkish society have also 
fueled an embrace of Kemalism. With these findings, I attempt to contextualize Turkish 
American diasporic identities, illustrating that they are complex in that they evolve in 
tandem with transnational experiences and developments.  
Background 
 
There is a rich literature on Turkish migration and diaspora populations 
originating in Turkey. From Turkish immigrants and diaspora communities in Germany 
and France (Mandel 2008; Yurdakul 2009) to Kurds, who are an oppressed ethnic 
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minority in Turkey, and Alevis, a marginalized sect of Shia Islam, scholars have tackled a 
range of communities and national contexts (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Sökefeld 2008). 
These groups demonstrate the diversity of the Turkish diaspora experience and that the 
Kemalist Turkish Americans in my analysis are a highly specific and relatively 
homogenous political and cultural group. In focusing in on Kemalists, I attempt to 
analyze a very specific population which has been relatively overlooked by the broad 
literature on the Turkish diaspora.  
The specific population of Turkish Americans in this study are by no means 
representative of the entire Turkish American population. Kemalist Turkish Americans 
can be understood as individuals who ideologically align with Kemalism, or the secular 
nationalist ideology of the state of Turkey. Kemalism is the ideology created and 
propagated by the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who 
led the Turkish independence movement after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and formed 
the modern Turkish Republic in 1923. His ideology is one that relies on a modernization 
paradigm and which promotes Westernization, nationalism, and perhaps most centrally 
laïcité, which advocates for state control over religious practice and fundamentally 
believes that religion should be practiced privately and individually. (Şenay 2013). For 
the purposes of this study, other significant elements of Kemalism include an embrace of 
Western models of democratic citizenship and secular democracy; Atatürk was heavily 
influenced by Western Enlightenment ideals and was motivated to model the Turkish 
Republic after Western European models of democracy (Içduygu, Çolak and Soyarik 
1999). While Kemalism is a multifaceted phenomenon which can be seen in a number of 
forms and contexts, for the purposes of this analysis it is important to recognize it as a 
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political identity which persists today. I classify my respondents as Kemalists, or people 
who define their political and cultural orientations around their Kemalist views, including 
a strong belief in laïcité and support for the political and historical legacy of Ataturk. 
They stand in contrast to other ideological groups within Turkish society, such as 
Islamists or ultra-nationalists who have differing views on how the state should control 
religion or about the role of religion in public life. Kemalists specifically define 
themselves as being in opposition to Islamist groups in Turkish society, and in particular 
the Islamist governing party, the AK Party, which has been in power in Turkey since the 
early 2000s. It is this political context which is crucial to understanding why Kemalism is 
a distinct category of political and cultural identity, and why it is valuable to study.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Acts of belonging to both the host and home societies 
 
I first consider the general literature on immigrant to understand how diaspora 
groups may mobilize or rely on certain identities, ideologies, and beliefs to negotiate 
belonging in their host societies. Scholars have previously considered the ways in which 
immigrant groups have mediated belonging through other identities. For example, some 
have examined how religious identity has been used as a means for expressing and 
feeling belonging in the host country, while also linking immigrants to a broader 
transnational religious movement (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2008; Hepner 2003). 
Pentecostal Christian immigrants in Germany did not articulate their belonging to 
German society through narratives of citizenship and multiculturalism but rather 
“believed they belonged in Germany because of their status as believers'' and their 
membership in a global Pentecostal Christian movement (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2008, 
p. 204). In the Libyan diaspora, it was a strong ethno nationalist identity which created “a 
sense of belonging to the Libyan nation together with a sense of loyalty … towards the 
‘homeland’” (Aluni 2019, pp. 257-258).  
Understandings of citizenship can be a powerful tool of belonging for diaspora 
actors in the host society. Scholars of immigration in America have explored how 
immigrants tend to reject an assimilationist, ‘melting pot’ view of immigration, 
embracing instead a view of multiculturalism which grants them belonging in diverse 
American society while allowing them to retain their cultural, ethnic, religious, and 
national identities (Bloemraad 2006; Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008). In 
France, Turkish immigrant activists also embrace a hyphenated understanding of 
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citizenship in order to demand equal legal rights as well as cultural and ethnic distinction 
in the eyes of the French state (Demirci 2018; Kastoryano 2002). Ideologies and activism 
surrounding citizenship are thus influential factors in how diaspora actors negotiate 
belonging in both their home and host societies. This begs the question of how Kemalism 
relates to these examples and how it may play a similar role in diasporic identity and 
negotiations of belonging.  
Long-distance nationalism and the anomaly of Kemalism 
 
Next I narrow in on the literature of long-distance nationalism which is a 
significant component of diasporic identity. The literature on long-distance nationalism 
has been an influential part of diaspora studies since the 1990s and can be broadly 
defined as “a set of identity claims and practices that connect people living in various 
geographic locations to a specific territory that they see as their ancestral home” (Glick 
Schiller 2005, p. 570). It has been studied in a plethora of diaspora contexts around the 
world, from the Tibetan, Eritrean, East Timorese, Lithuanian diasporas, and more (Misra 
2010; Hepner 2010; Wise 2004; Ciubrinskas 2013). Within these explorations, for 
instance Ciubrinskas’ (2013) examination of Lithuanian long-distance nationalism, the 
diaspora’s relation to the state of its home country plays an influential role in the shaping 
of nationalism. As many Lithuanian Americans had settled in the United States after 
leaving Lithuania during the Soviet period, central to their diasporic identity was a 
“commitment to homeland nationalism expressed in the feeling of duty and mission to do 
what is possible to retain the ‘national culture’ challenged by Soviet occupation” 
(Ciubrinskas 2013, p.118). Here we see how long-distance nationalism is articulated, 
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often motivated by a desire to retain cultural or national distinction, in response to 
pressures from the political situation in the home country.  
Furthermore, the aforementioned examples are all similar in that they examine 
long-distance nationalism predominantly within diaspora populations in exile; these 
groups usually have had to flee their home countries due to violent conflict or state 
repression, or might have been targeted on the basis of their minority ethnic and religious 
identities by the state. While not all studies of long-distance nationalism have focused on 
groups in political exile, which we will explore further later, some scholars such as Skrbiš 
(1999) have argued that “long-distance nationalism develops only if an emigrant 
population contains a critical mass of political exiles that has experienced a loss of status 
in their homeland” (as cited in Şenay 2013). Glick Schiller’s (2005) broad discussions of 
examples of long-distance nationalism emphasize political and separatist struggles taken 
up by diasporas who are at odds with the regimes in their home countries. These scholars 
emphasize the ways that the political pressure of exile, brought on from individuals’ ties 
to their home country, is influential in motivating and shaping the development of 
nationalism.  
These examples are notably different from the case of Turkish long-distance 
nationalism in the form of Kemalism, however. While it operates in the same timbre as 
the aforementioned examples, such as through transnational political ties, desires of 
cultural retention, and maintaining national distinction in the diaspora, the case of 
Kemalism is unique from other exiled populations, specifically in its relation to the 
Turkish state. In her study on Kemalism in the Turkish Australian diaspora, Banu Şenay 
(2013) works through this theoretical complication, explaining that Kemalist diaspora 
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actors cannot be categorized as a traditional exiled population, as they migrated for the 
purpose of seeking economic opportunities rather than due to persecution on the basis of 
their identities. Thus she explains that “what causes the long-distance nationalism of 
Kemalists is not their minority status but their ideological affiliations and emotional 
commitments” (Şenay 2013, p. 379). She continues to discuss how a loss of legitimacy in 
Turkey in the wake of the Islamist AKP government has led Kemalist elites to “no longer 
occupy unchallenged hegemonic or professionally distinct positions in Turkish politics” 
which has prompted a unique threat narrative within the diaspora (Şenay 2013, p. 379). 
Therefore the Kemalist case stands out from the majority of studies in the field of long-
distance nationalism, as the diaspora population in question has a different relationship to 
the state than those of traditional exiled groups.  
 
Kemalism in the diaspora  
 
 Lastly, I consider the how scholars have approached the specific example of 
Kemalism in diaspora. Many scholars of Kemalism in the 21st century consider the 
phenomenon in context of the changing political sphere in Turkey. Not only has 
Kemalism continued to take on a new urgency for secularist Turks who feel threatened by 
the Islamist government, but it has become a powerful force of nostalgia (Özyürek 2006). 
Longing for the time before the current Islamist regime, Kemalism becomes a 
“sentimental state of longing and nostalgia for the past” (Şenay 2013, p. 382). This is 
reflected across the diaspora through a number of mediums, including local 
organizational activism, media consumption and circulation, and in individual practices.  
Another scholar who focuses more generally on Turkish American diasporic 
identity is Cameron Thibos (2014), whose work narrows in on how Turkish nationalist 
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causes, such as denial of the Armenian Genocide, have become a central tenet of Turkish 
identity and activism in the diaspora. In order to explain the prevalence of this 
phenomenon, then, he employs the analytical framework of competitive identity 
development, explaining that the struggle for recognition of the Armenian genocide by 
the Armenian diaspora has prompted an intense Turkish opposition which has 
“fundamentally shaped the construction of Turkish American diasporic consciousness” 
(Thibos 2014, p. 5). With this example, we see how Turkish nationalism can be employed 
within a diaspora context in response to domestic pressures; not only do Turkish 
American actors embrace and mobilize around Kemalist ideology in response to the 
changing political situation in Turkey, but also when faced with competitive identity 
threats from other diaspora groups in the United States. 
 While Thibos considers the Turkish diaspora in the United States, other scholars 
of the Turkish diaspora have looked at Kemalism different national contexts. Working in 
Australia, Banu Şenay (2013) similarly examines Kemalism in the context of diaspora in 
her study of Kemalists in the Turkish Australian diaspora. Just as Kemalist actors are 
threatened by the rise of Islamism and the Islamist government of Turkey, she finds that 
“they also wish to live in an Australia sterilised against ‘out of place’ Muslims” (Şenay 
2013, p. 388). Their Kemalist beliefs are also in conversation with the political changes 
in Australian society, as they feel threatened by the presence of other Muslim immigrants 
who do not conform to their secular ideals. This anti-Islamic/Islamist sentiment amongst 
Kemalist actors, who differentiate themselves from other Muslims because of their 
secular beliefs, is consistent within studies of Kemalist political discourse in Turkey and 
the broader diaspora (Arat-Koç 2017; Aydar 2018; Yorukoğlu 2017).  
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METHODS 
 
 
The primary methods of data collection were interviews and supplemental 
participant observation at a Turkish American cultural organization. These methods were 
selected for their ability to capture in-depth the responses and views of a narrow, specific 
population.  
Interviews 
 
Interviews were chosen as the primary method of data collection for the project as 
they resulted in the most comprehensive, detailed perspective on the views and identities 
of subjects. The format of interviews allowed for greater flexibility and more in-depth 
responses than a survey format and 13 interviews were conducted with Turkish American 
candidates, each of which lasted about 45 to 60 minutes. The interviews were conducted 
in person or via phone, and were kept completely confidential- identifying information 
was not collected or shared with others besides myself. Data was collected through the 
recording of interviews upon the consent of the interviewee, and were later destroyed 
upon completion of the analysis. The format of the interviews also allowed for significant 
flexibility in asking questions, allowing for a space where interviewees could be asked to 
elaborate upon their answers and their views more clearly when needed. The personal, 
casual environment of the interviews allowed interviewees to respond with a mixture of 
Turkish and English, if they saw fit. While some interviewees might have been 
uncomfortable sharing political views or opinions, the casual and familiar interview 
format lessened this tension and created an environment conducive to openness and 
honesty 
11 
 
The interviewees were primarily first generation Turkish Americans, of differing 
genders and from ages 30-50. The study only considered first-generation Americans and 
did not include second-generation Americans, as the dynamics and views presented by 
both groups would have been very different. To allow for a comprehensive discussion of 
one group, the study opted to include only first-generation Turkish Americans, as a way 
of focusing on their unique experiences and relationship with national identity. Due to the 
demographics of the Turkish American community in Southeast Michigan and its first-
generation members, the interviewees were all of middle to upper middle class 
backgrounds. Many of them had originally immigrated to the United States with the 
intention of pursuing graduate-level education or similar professional fellowships at 
universities.  
The homogenous nature of the class backgrounds of the community was a 
consequence of the nature of the Turkish American community in the Southeast 
Michigan area, as most its members are of similar socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Additionally, much of the Turkish American community in the area, including the 
interview subjects, are ethnically Turkish and are of Muslim faith but identify as secular. 
This is an important characteristic to mention as there are a minority of Turkish 
Americans in the Turkish American community of Southeastern Michigan who identify 
as conservative or religious Muslims. While this dynamic will be discussed later in the 
analysis, it should be noted that religious differences and socioeconomic divisions are 
present in the Turkish community.  
While the cultural organization I consider in this project chose to identify 
explicitly as secular, there are several smaller Turkish cultural organizations in Southeast 
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Michigan which organize more specifically around religious practice and tradition. 
Initially, one of such organizations was reached out to for the purposes of this project, 
however they did not respond to requests for interviews. Therefore, this study exclusively 
considers the views and identities of a specific subset of the Turkish American diaspora, 
which have socio economic and religious identities. This study does not contend to 
represent the views and experiences of all Turkish Americans, but intentionally choses to 
explore the identities of a significant subset of the Turkish American community, as 
opposed to taking on a comparative approach. A comparative look at the identities of 
Turkish Americans of differing religious and ethnic backgrounds could be the subject of 
a future study. 
Participant Observation 
 
In addition to interviews, roughly 10 hours of ethnographic observation of a local 
Turkish American organization was conducted to supplement interview data. The 
material yielded from observation was valuable to the project as it helped contextualize 
some of the responses of interviewees, especially as a majority of the interviewees were 
also members of the organization chosen for observation. The majority of ethnographic 
observation, over 6 hours, took place at a well-attended event organized by the Turkish 
cultural association to celebrate Turkish Independence Day. I chose the event it reflected 
certain understandings about the place of Turkish Americans in American society and the 
role of Turkish Americans in the Turkish national sphere. It also allowed for in-depth 
conversations with attendees at the event, who were almost exclusively members of the 
Turkish American community, which was a relevant supplement to interview data. 
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A limitation of the ethnographic approach was my position within the community 
as a potential intruder. While I have a personal relation and connection to the community, 
it might have been difficult for me to adopt a critical lens, as someone closely familiar 
with the social and political context of the event. Additionally, another limitation might 
have arisen from the fact that a small number of attendees, approximately 5 out of 200 
people, knew that I was there to observe for a project, as they had been previously 
interviewed for the project. This awareness of the observer might have prompted them to 
act or behave differently in the face of scrutiny.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
I examine the role of Kemalism to Turkish American diasporic identity and how 
transnational pressures shape Turkish diasporic identity in the United States. I argue that 
Kemalism is significant to Turkish American diasporic identity as because it functions as 
an act of belonging, as a representation of Turkish cultural identity, and as a response to a 
perceived loss of legitimacy in Turkish society. It becomes clear that Kemalism has been 
reconstructed in the diaspora in response to the unique transnational pressures put on 
Turkish Americans from both host and home country political contexts. I will now 
discuss and analyze these three elements of the formation of Turkish American diasporic 
identity.  
Kemalism as an act of belonging in the United States 
 
In the following section I argue that Kemalism is an integral part of Turkish 
American negotiations of belonging. In response to their perception of alienation and 
fundamental misunderstanding from their American peers, respondents felt the need to 
reclaim their image and present themselves as productive members of society, and 
therefore worthy of belonging. To accomplish this mission, they turned to Kemalism as a 
method of belonging since they believed it exemplified Western values and overlapped 
with Americanness. These ideals were significant as they revealed how Turkish 
Americans' notions of belonging were tied to a perception of their own Kemalist 
identities as being compatible with American society and worthy of belonging.  
The need to negotiate belonging came about and took on a new sense of urgency 
because of respondents’ alienation and perceptions of their negative image as Turks in 
American society. Interviews revealed that Turkish Americans were greatly concerned 
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with how their American peers and society viewed them, based on ideas expressed 
through media narratives or opinions shared in passing conversations. Firstly, many 
respondents believed that Americans simply were not informed about Turkey, including 
its geographic location, its political history, and its current political climate. Others 
expressed that many Americans were just recently beginning to learn about Turkey 
through news headlines regarding its foreign policy and political developments, such as 
its role in the Syrian conflict or the actions of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan. These perceptions were largely acquired from and based on personal 
experiences, anecdotes and encounters that my interviewees had had with American 
peers. For instance, two interviewees stated:  
I think all the Americans know where Turkey is now, from the news. When I first 
moved in the late 90s, we weren’t on the news that often … Turkey was a little bit 
more Western-oriented, before this current president and it was almost like a 
model that a Muslim country could be also secular. So people I think knew and 
admired how Turkey was moving … Now, they know about it because of the 
other issues and struggles that the region is going through. (Interviewee 13, 
November 2019) 
 
I don’t think they have any idea about Turkey. Like I can tell 80% [of Americans] 
think that we are an Arabic [sic.] country. Just one of those Muslim countries like 
Iran, like we have to cover our heads, we don’t have any accessibility to modern 
life, we don’t have democracy, our education sucks. They think we are in the 
middle of nowhere, just one of those Arabic countries, and we are living in a very 
bad situation and riding our camels. (Interviewee 10, November 2019) 
 
These experiences illustrate how immigrants internalize host country narratives 
about themselves when conceptualizing their own immigrant identities. Studies on 
Turkish immigrants in Germany have also explored how “Turkish immigrants grapple 
with and internalize the ways that Germans portray them” (Ehrkamp 2006, p.1686). 
Ehrkamp illustrates how Turkish immigrants would often reference and respond to 
political debates regarding their role in German society as immigrants, including their 
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categorization as ‘guest workers’ or unassimilated ‘others’ in German society. In 
response to their perceived alienation and contested relationship with dominant 
narratives, she determines that Turkish immigrants attempt to “assert their belonging in 
German society and cities by participating in local politics and claiming their place in 
German society” (Ehrkamp 2006, p. 1674). Similarly, we can observe how Turkish 
Americans have internalized narratives regarding themselves, which in turn has 
mobilized them to seek new ways of claiming belonging. 
Hence my interviewees combatted negative narratives by promoting Kemalism 
and Ataturk’s legacy through education and recognition initiatives. Many advocated that 
Turkish Americans, and their representative organizations such as TACAM, should work 
to educate Americans about the “true nature” or “origins” of Turkey as a country founded 
on Kemalist principles. They believed that educating the American public about Turkey’s 
secular, Western values, among other things, would put forth a positive image of Turks, 
showcase their compatibility with American values and ‘Americanness,’ and therefore 
their worthiness of belonging. Their conception of the overlap between American and 
Kemalist values can be seen in statements regarding respondents’ ideas about 
‘Americanness.’  
America is a united people, a united nation. It has many ethnic people, many 
religious people. All laws of the United States are based on secularity, they don’t 
decide based on ethnicity or religion. So it [Ataturk’s secularism] is quite 
appropriate to the United States. (Interviewee 3, October 2019) 
 
The connections Turkish Americans made between Kemalism and belonging in 
the US were also reflected in the work of the organization TACAM. In addition to 
organizing programs for the local Turkish community, TACAM leaders believed it was 
their role to dispel negative notions about Turks while also negotiating belonging in 
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American society. As one respondent put it, TACAM must dispel negative notions and 
“show we are a part of this society and Western civilization.” (Interviewee 4, October 
2019) The negotiation of belonging through an embrace of Kemalism was also reflected 
in TACAM’s outreach initiatives. One such initiative was the issuing of proclamations to 
local city and state governments to designate October 29th as Turkish Republic Day. 
TACAM leaders expressed that this initiative helped involve Turkish Americans in local 
government as well as bring the issues they care about into the American public sphere. 
One leader from TACAM stated that these provided “an important way of us reaching to 
the people living around us saying we are here, we are celebrating this day and join us in 
celebrating this day.”	(Interviewee 4, October 2019). This mission to stake a claim for 
Turkish Americans in American society is a negotiation of belonging.  
Furthermore, the proclamations themselves contain language which illustrates the 
link between Kemalism and Americanness by highlighting Turkey’s secularism and 
Western alignment. The following are direct quotes from a proclamation issued by 
TACAM to the state government of Michigan, recognizing October 29th as Turkish 
Republic Day. 
“Turkey is the only secular democracy in the Muslim world and has made 
significant contributions to United States foreign policy”  
 
“Turkey was one of the first allies to show unconditional solidarity with our 
Nation in the war against terrorism and has thrice commanded the International 
Peacekeeping in Afghanistan” 
 
The proclamations present a valuable look into how Turkish Americans view themselves 
in relation to American society and negotiate their belonging in the process. They reveal 
the kinds of traits which Turkish Americans believe to be positive, and more broadly, 
what values or characteristics they believe make an immigrant community worthy of 
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belonging to American society. In line with Kemalist ideology, Turkish Americans 
believe that the secular, democratic origins of their state, its contributions to the West, 
and its alliances with the United States make them worthy of being recognized as equal, 
productive members of American society. It is also significant that TACAM as an 
organization chooses Turkish Independence Day, a nationalist holiday that celebrates 
Ataturk, as the day most worthy of recognition by their fellow Americans. I will return to 
this notion in later discussions of the interconnected nature of Turkish cultural identity 
and Kemalism.  
Similarly, another TACAM initiative which illustrated the use of Kemalism in 
claims of belonging to the United States was the recently established Ataturk Park. The 
park itself features an open green area and a walking path, and more notably a small bust 
of Ataturk himself in the center of the space. Many respondents were impressed at this 
TACAM initiative and deemed it valuable not just as a contribution to the Turkish 
American community but as an educational and promotional tool for their American 
peers. One interviewee stated that: 
It’s very important to me because it’s good to educate the society of the US about 
a great military and political statesman like Ataturk. I think it’s a point of pride 
that we Turks have a person like that ... I think it’s good cultural advocacy to 
spread knowledge. (Interviewee 11, November 2019) 
 
TACAM members’ rationales for creating the initiative revealed that they saw Ataturk as 
a point of pride in their identities. They expressed the desire to introduce the figure of 
Ataturk to Americans because of the importance of his values and accomplishments. 
Both the proclamations and the Park showcase how Turkish Americans engage with the 
American public sphere through a promotion of Kemalism in order to respond to and 
negate their feelings of alienation from American society; they highlight the values and 
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history they believe to be compatible with Americanness and which make them worthy of 
belonging. This helps us understand how in a transnational context, Kemalism has been 
reconstructed as Turkish Americans lay claim to the ideology in response to pressures 
from their host country.  
Kemalism as an act of cultural retention 
 
 Another new reconstruction of Kemalism in a diaspora context is its significance 
as a cultural identity marker of Turkishness for Turkish Americans. In other words, my 
respondents believed Kemalism to be an integral part of Turkishness, and thus promoted 
it as an act of cultural retention in the diaspora. This act of cultural retention and its 
significance is a characteristic of diaspora contexts and can be understood as a response 
to domestic pressures from the host country.  
 Firstly, we can observe the overlapping nature of Turkish American cultural 
identity and Kemalism in many responses of my Kemalist interviewees. Most 
respondents did not make a clear distinction between celebrating Turkish-state sponsored 
nationalist events, such as Independence Day or “National Sovereignty and Children’s 
Day”, or cultural and religious events such as Eid al-Adha (known in as Kurban Bayramı 
in Turkish) or Eid al-Fitr (known as Şeker Bayramı in Turkish). This way of thinking was 
also echoed by TACAM as an organization and its leaders. I argue that the lack of 
distinction between national and cultural events is evidence of the role of Kemalism in 
Turkish American understandings of Turkish cultural identity and ‘Turkishness.’ The 
ways that my respondents centralized Kemalism as a crucial, defining aspect of their 
cultural identities aligns with the Turkish nationalist articulation of categories of nation, 
ethnicity, culture, and language. Therefore, the presence of Kemalist or nationalist ideals 
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or celebrations was never questioned or challenged for my respondents and for the 
members of TACAM which I interviewed.  
Given how integral Kemalism was to Turkish cultural identity for my Kemalist 
respondents, we can thus understand the prevalence of Kemalism as an act of cultural 
promotion and retention for Turkish Americans in the diaspora. This diasporic dynamic 
became apparent in respondents’ discussions of wanting to “pass down” Kemalism to 
their children. All interviewees were first-generation Turkish Americans, born in Turkey 
but naturalized as US citizens, and almost all of them had children who were born and 
raised primarily in the United States. Many respondents answered that one of their main 
reasons for being involved in the Turkish American community was wanting their 
children to grow up around the Turkish language and Turkish culture. Many stated that 
they were involved in TACAM specifically so that they could bring their children to 
cultural and national events. They placed great importance on not only educating their 
children in the Turkish language and culture, but also the values and norms of Kemalism, 
as well as the role of Ataturk in Turkish history.  
It’s one of the main reasons we go to national events, because we grew up with 
them in Turkey. They are also important events because they emphasize important 
values not only in our culture, but also universally. They emphasize democracy, 
human rights, freedom. For instance, the upcoming event is the celebration of the 
Republic, the establishment of the Republic in Turkey. It’s not just about the 
Republic but it comes with a lot of different values, and we also want to 
emphasize those and we want the children to remember those as 
well. (Interviewee 7, October 2019) 
 
I argue that this is evidence of how cultural identity or retention takes on increased 
importance in a diaspora context. For first-generation Turkish Americans, who expressed 
that “passing down” Turkish culture to their children was of significance to them, 
Kemalism takes on an additional importance to retain Turkishness for their American 
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children. The overlap between Kemalism and cultural identity is better understood, then, 
in a diasporic context where it takes on a new importance in light of being in diaspora 
and away from the home country. A similar example can be seen in the Lithuanian 
diaspora, where diasporic identity largely relied on “cherishing and perpetuating nation-
ness in terms of culture, language, traditions, and heritage” (Ciubrinskas 2013). Teaching 
children the Lithuanian language, passing down cultural traditions as well as supporting 
the Lithuanian nation became central aspects of community life and practice for 
Lithuanian Americans. In the Lithuanian example, however, such activities took on an 
increased importance in light of Soviet occupation of Lithuania, with many diaspora 
exiles believing that they would one day return to Lithuania after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Turkish Americans present a unique case of diasporic identity, as they may 
exhibit some of the same beliefs and practices as exiled diasporic groups who are at odds 
with their home country states, while not being in exile and in fact actively supporting the 
Turkish nationalist project. The unique case of Kemalist Turkish Americans to studies of 
long-distance nationalism and diasporic identity thus presents a theoretical challenge and 
will be further explored in the discussion to follow. 
Kemalism as a response to a loss of legitimacy in Turkish society 
 
Lastly, the significance and prevalence of Kemalism in the Turkish American 
diasporic identity must be understood in the context of Kemalist Turkish Americans’ loss 
of legitimacy in Turkish society. Alienated and threatened by the political changes which 
have taken place in Turkey over the last twenty years, Turkish Americans who identify 
with Kemalism, or as secular Turks, have increasingly felt the need to respond to threats 
to their identity. My respondents embraced Kemalism in new ways as they felt political 
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pressures from their home country, especially as the diaspora context allowed them to 
express their beliefs freely without fear of backlash from the Turkish government.  
One very significant reality is the alienation and frustration that Turkish 
Americans feel from the developments in Turkish politics over the years. Respondents 
felt that since the Islamist AK Party came to power, Turkey had undergone severe 
changes in its cultural, religious makeup as well as its orientation towards other countries. 
One interviewee commented that: 
There’s a Turkey that I left 15 years ago and there’s another Turkey now. Our 
image is not good and as a government, they are making it worse. They are not 
spending any time for our image. We are doing many embarrassing things, our 
democracy is not working, the judicial system is not working. (Interviewee 10, 
November 2019) 
 
These ideas were largely reflected in their understandings of their current image in 
American society, such as Turks being seen as Middle Eastern or being conflated with 
Muslim Arabs, which they understood to be reflective of the societal and cultural shifts in 
Turkish society. One respondent declared that Turkey was now seen as “a religious 
country governed by Islamic rule” which was reflective of the very pertinent and stark 
feelings of political alienation experienced by Turkish Americans. 
The link between the threat to Kemalism in Turkey and the need to promote 
Kemalism in the United States was explicitly stated in a number of responses. 
Interviewees felt that while they did not have the ability to control the government 
policies or societal changes they witnessed in Turkey, they did have the agency to 
implement some changes or certain lifestyle choices which were in line with their 
Kemalist beliefs in their Turkish American community. One interviewee said: 
It feels like as a Turkish person, both at home and here, that our identity is being 
threatened quite a bit. With the recent AKP government and their politics, it feels 
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like it’s a secured space and time for us to be ourselves and represent the best 
selves that we can put forward. (Interviewee 5, October 2019) 
 
Examples of such efforts were the initiatives taken by TACAM, such as the 
Ataturk Park, the celebration of nationalist events such as Independence Day, or the 
passing down of Kemalist values and history to their second-generation children. This 
dynamic is one which helps us understand diaspora’s unique contributions to the 
development and embrace of Kemalism; not only were my respondents threatened and 
motivated by political pressures from the home country, but they were compelled to act 
on their feelings because their diaspora context in allowed them to express their views 
more openly without the same fear of retribution or backlash which they might have felt 
in Turkish society. The diaspora context in the United States was a “secured space” 
where Kemalist Turks could mobilize in their own ways against the threats from the 
Turkish political climate while not having to worry about potential retribution from the 
state.  
Threatened but not in exile 
 
 It is important to delineate Kemalist Turkish Americans from other diaspora 
populations in exile, not only to better understand their specific ideological situation but 
to recognize that the transnational pressures they face are more complex than simply 
being oppressed by their home state. While my interviewees were vocal in their 
alienation from the current Islamist government of Turkey, they had complex responses 
when it came to defending Turkish state actions in the United States. As interviews were 
being conducted, Turkey was in the midst of a military operation wherein it invaded 
Northern Syria to attack Kurdish militias stationed there. Several respondents specifically 
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referenced the ways that they felt the American media cycle was unfairly demonizing 
Turkey’s involvement in Syria and its military action against Kurdish groups.  
Additionally, this coincided with a vote in the US House of Representatives 
wherein a resolution recognizing the Armenian Genocide was passed. The state of 
Turkey and many Turkish citizens were outraged at the passing of the resolution, as their 
official stance was against the usage of the term genocide to describe Ottoman Turkish 
atrocities against Armenians. While some respondents acknowledged that they did not 
support some of the actions of the Turkish government, there was an overwhelming 
consensus that Turks were being wrongly vilified and that it was the responsibility of 
Turkish Americans to advocate for a more positive image. Interviewees felt the need to 
defend and clarify the Turkish government when its actions aligned with their nationalist, 
Kemalist outlooks. This differed from their stances on other Turkish government actions, 
where they saw themselves as fundamentally opposed to Turkey’s Islamist government, 
such as state policies which conflicted with their secular or ‘Western’ values. However, it 
was when the state’s actions aligned with Kemalism’s secular nationalist paradigm that 
some of my respondents felt the need to defend and clarify the actions of the state.  
In the case of the aforementioned examples, the military incursion against 
Kurdish militias in Northern Syria or the denial of the Armenian Genocide were both 
state actions which were in accordance with Kemalism, which has always furthered 
policies of denial and a strong nationalist, militarist outlook towards Turkey’s Kurdish 
population. Thus, we see that the relationship between Kemalist Turkish Americans to 
the current Turkish government is a complicated one that evades strict categorization and 
which has significant implications for the ways in which they engage with Kemalism in 
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the diaspora. The Turkish American diasporic population cannot be characterized as 
being directly marginalized by the Turkish state, as they actively support and hold a stake 
in carrying on its legitimacy. This is in direct contrast to more traditional exiled diasporic 
populations, such as Kurds, who are threatened by the Turkish state not only through a 
history of identity-based violence and oppression but through a continuing violent 
conflict in Turkey’s Southeast region. Kemalist Turkish Americans in the diaspora, 
therefore, present an interesting anomaly to the traditional literature on exiled diaspora 
populations such as the Kurds in Turkey. 
 In her study on Kemalist Turkish immigrants in Australia, Şenay (2013) engages 
with her population in tandem with Glick Schiller’s (2005) concept of long-distance 
nationalism, which is typically studied within diaspora groups who are in exile from their 
home countries. Many scholars have argued that long-distance nationalism primarily 
develops in exiled diaspora groups because it is motivated by a loss of status and a desire 
to mobilize against repressive governments. This leads us to questions of why long-
distance nationalism has developed in the Kemalist Turkish American diaspora and also 
to ask what the status of Kemalist Turkish Americans is via the Turkish state. Şenay 
elaborates on the argument of Kemalist activism as being a response to a loss of 
legitimacy, and how this is perceived loss of status has led to a sense of threatened 
identity. This concept is useful in understanding why Kemalism, a national state 
ideology, has been promoted by Turkish Americans seemingly as a response against the 
current Turkish state. Kemalist Turkish Americans, then, are not strictly an exiled 
community; they are not necessarily singled out by the Turkish state on the basis of their 
ethnic and religious identities or political beliefs, while other groups such as Kurds, can 
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solidly be categorized as populations in exile (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). They play an 
active stake in promoting and embracing a state national ideology which also provides 
them with legitimacy and power in society. 
Kemalism and transnational pressures in a diaspora context 
 
My discussions of the reconstruction of Kemalism in diaspora lead to the question 
of how transnational pressures shape and influence such meaning making processes. It 
becomes clear that there isn’t a single phenomenon or political occurrence that can 
explain the prevalence and centrality of Kemalism to the Turkish American diasporic 
identity. When the members of TACAM mobilized to pool their funds into building an 
Ataturk Park, there were a plethora of motivations and pressure which motivated their 
initiative. They were not only responding to a political situation in Turkey which 
threatened their identities and beliefs, but they were motivated by a need to contribute to 
their host country society, to present themselves as worthy American citizens, and to 
educate their children and others about their Kemalist political identities. These 
complexities provide us with a valuable context to understand not only Kemalism in 
diaspora but also other cases of long-distance nationalism.  
Oftentimes studies of long-distance nationalism primarily focus on transnational 
pressures and how connections from the home country motivate or shape nationalism in 
diaspora. A focus on solely international or home country pressures can often overlook 
how domestic dynamics, or host country pressures, also present a valuable context to 
better understanding long-distance nationalism. In other words, long-distance nationalism 
is often imagined as a linear relationship between diasporic actors in their home 
countries, with pressures from the latter shaping actions within the former. Within my 
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analysis of Kemalism in the Turkish American diaspora, I try to not only question how 
pressures from Turkey and the Turkish government motivate diasporic actors, but also 
how their identities, beliefs, and motivations are influenced by pressures from American 
society. This relationship can be seen in Figure 1 below.  
Figure 1. 
 
 It becomes clear that it is impossible to consider Kemalist identities in diaspora 
without considering how both domestic and international pressures play out onto their 
daily lives, beliefs, and diasporic activities.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The secular nationalist ideology of Kemalism has come to take on new 
importance within the Turkish American diasporic imaginary as it has faced multi-
faceted transnational pressures. I argue that Kemalism is significant to Turkish American 
diasporic identity as because it functions as an act of belonging, as a representation of 
Turkish cultural identity, and as a response to a perceived loss of legitimacy in Turkish 
society. It becomes clear that Kemalism has been reconstructed in the diaspora in 
response to the unique transnational pressures put on Turkish Americans from both host 
and home country political contexts. Outside of the context of Turkey, Kemalism has 
been granted new meanings in the diaspora space by its supporters, whose transnational 
positioning leaves them to grapple with challenges from both home and host countries. 
Finally, Kemalism is central to understanding how this particular population of Turkish 
Americans has taken on the complex challenges of navigating different cultural, national 
contexts and the compelling question of their transnational identities.  
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